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ABSTRACT

Who is Most Likely to Remain on Welfare?
by
Sonya M. Kessinger
Dr. Thomas M. Carroll, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Economics
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Recent welfare reform legislation imposes a five year limit on federal welfare
benefits. This study examines earnings, family structure and race to determine their
impact on the associated probabilities of remaining on welfare. Data o f families that
received AFDC in the first year of a two-year period is analyzed. In the second year,
some of these families stopped receiving benefits while others continued on welfare.
Based on characteristics from the first year, a logit model develops the probabilities of
leaving welfare rolls in the second year. These characteristics include earnings,
employment, the average state benefit, age, gender, marital status, children, education and
race. The results o f the model indicate that low earning, unemployed, unmarried women
with children, in high-benefit states are least likely to leave welfare rolls. Findings on
education and race show that a having a college degree and being black also increase the
likelihood o f staying on welfare.

Ill
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Welfare programs in the United States began around the turn of the century and
were established for families in which the primary wage earner and source o f income was
absent. These early programs were intended to provide assistance for widows and to keep
families intact by preventing the institutionalization o f children. Temporary Aid to Needy
Families, or TANF, is the modem day welfare program, and it primarily serves single
mothers with children under the age o f 18. TANF replaces the long-time federal
program. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) which was established in
1935 as part of the Social Security Act.
Since the beginning o f the Federal welfare program, there has been controversy
about its success and social impact. Many welfare reform programs have been
implemented since the late 1960’s with limited results. In the summer of 1996, Congress
enacted yet another welfare reform program under the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Under this act, TANF replaces AFDC and implements a
major shift in policy by placing a five year limit on the amount o f time families may
receive Federal welfare assistance. Reducing welfare rolls and job training are additional
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goals o f the legislation. States must reduce welfare rolls or lose a portion o f their Federal
funding. The Federally mandated target welfare reductions are 25 percent by September
1997 and 50 percent by the year 2002. Estimates predict that the first reduction will
place the most employable welfare recipients in the labor force. This group generally has
greater levels o f human capital than the second target reduction group which will be more
difficult to employ. It is estimated that one-million new jobs will be needed in order to
meet the first 25 percent reduction.’
Time limits on Federal assistance and welfare roll reductions are clear goals o f the
welfare reform legislation, but it is not as clear how to move people into the work force.
What groups should the government target for work programs or other types of
assistance? This study examines the impact o f factors such as earnings, employment,
family structure, education and race on the probabilities of leaving welfare in order to
determine how these factors influence the likelihood o f remaining on welfare.
Chapter 2 of this study provides a review o f the literature. Chapter 3 describes the
empirical model and the data used in the analysis. Chapter 4 presents the results o f the
empirical model, and Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks and policy
recommendations.

‘ Bill Leonard, “Welfare Reform: A Deal for HR; Employment for Welfare Recipients,” Human
Resources M agazine 42, (March 1997): 79, quoting W alter D. Broadnax, professor o f Public Policy at the
University o f Maryland.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Gary Becker is a pioneer o f the theory behind economics that relate to social
issues such as race and family structure, including marriage, the sexual division o f labor,
and child bearing. Becker bases his analyses on the premise that social and cultural
events have economic consequences, and that individuals seek to maximize their utility
through social and cultural mechanisms. Becker applies these same principals to
marriage, investment in human capital and the demand for children. Elements o f family
structure, such as marriage, are conducive to division o f labor which has an economic
impact on households. Becker believes that government aid lowers the cost o f children,
thereby, increasing the demand for children. While children and family structure generate
both monetary and opportunity costs, it is not clear that welfare causes families to have
more children. Such a statement brings into focus the debate between the conservative
and liberal views regarding the effects o f welfare.
The conservative view generally opposes cash assistance to the poor m aintaining
that welfare creates poverty, encourages family break-ups and is responsible for the
increase in out-of-wedlock births. The liberal view supports government assistance for
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the poor, maintaining that welfare reduces poverty and does not significantly contribute
to social problems such as teen pregnancy. Causality is at the heart of the debate in the
politiczil arena, with many studies on welfare attempting to prove the direction of
causality.
This study differs firom many other economic studies on welfare in three ways.
First, it does not attempt to prove the direction o f causality; either welfare causes poverty
and impacts family structure or vice-versa. However, the model is built on the underlying
assumption that earnings and family structure affect the decision to receive welfare. This
assumption is well supported by previous studies.^ The second way this study differs
firom others is that it does not contrast families receiving welfare benefits with families in
the general population. All of the households in the model received welfare in the first
year o f a two-year period. In the second year, some o f the households stopped receiving
benefits while others continued on welfare. Finally, this study differs firom most others in
that it is not limited to single women and children who comprise the majority of welfare
recipients. The purpose of this study is to determine which demographic groups are most
likely to remain on welfare. Studies that relate to this topic examine the duration of
welfare spells, the interdependence of demographic characteristics and welfare, and the
impact of social-economic characteristics on the probability o f receiving welfare.

^ Studies that support the underlying hypothesis may be found in Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects
o f the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A Review (University o f Wisconsin: Madison, 1991): 24-45; Emily P.
Hoffman, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Female Poverty,” Growth and Change 22
(Spring 1991): 36-47; Saul D. Hoffinan and Greg J. Duncan, “The Effect o f Incomes, Wages, and AFDC
Benefits on Marital Distruption.” The Journal o f Human Resources 30 (W inter 1995): 19-41.
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Groups with the longest welfare spells will probably have the most difficulty
entering the labor force under the new welfare laws. Blank (1989) and Fitzgerald (1991)
find that low educated women with more children tend to have the longest welfare spells.
Fitzgerald also finds that longer welfare spells among black women are related to their
lower probability o f marriage.
Besharov and Sullivan (1996) study the interdependence of income, family
structure, race and welfare. According to the authors many divorced and unwed mothers
escape welfare only through marriage. Women who were teen mothers are less likely to
marry by the age o f 28, and they are less likely to have a high school diploma. Tilly and
Albelda (1994) find that family structure effects economic well-being. Single mothers
tend to have very low earnings on average, while young childless couples tend to have
high earnings. Black families and families with children present also tend to have lower
family incomes. Byrne, Myers, and King (1991) find that pregnancies by unwed
teenagers lead to fewer years of education completed.
Blank and Ruggles (1996) examine AFDC participation rates among eligible
women to determine whether families participating in these programs have the greatest
long term need and the most difficulty entering the work force. The authors find that
increases in age, education and wages increase the probability of leaving welfare. Women
with higher education levels are less likely to enroll in welfare programs even when they
are eligible. This leads to the conclusion that these women anticipate higher future
earnings and less of a need for welfare.
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Barr and Hall (1981) study dependence on welfare based on characteristics such
as race, education, age, the number o f children in the household and other characteristics.
The authors conclude that wages are inversely related to dependence on welfare and that
higher state AFDC payments tend to decrease the labor supply of welfare recipients. The
authors also find that age, educational attainment, and the presence o f preschool children
are significant in predicting dependence on welfare. Previous studies on welfare
dependence show that earnings and family structure generally impact the probability o f
receiving welfare.
While there are many studies examining the impact of welfare on Blacks and
Whites, there are very few that target differences between Hispanics and other races.
Studies that include Hispanics often focus on immigration and its relationship to the
receipt of welfare.
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CHAPTERS

EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION

In theory, the family head will seek to maximize utility by obtaining the desired
level o f goods and services for consumption. Families that meet eligibility requirements
may continue to receive or to leave welfare. The decision to receive welfare is a labor
demand function o f earnings, the amount o f the state welfare benefit, and o f leisure time.
T = f(w H , S, L ,x ) + e
Where T represents the decision to receive welfare, w/7 equals earnings, S equals the state
benefit, L equals leisure, and x is a vector o f other explanatory control variables including
race, age, children, gender and education. In theory, the family head will choose labor
over welfare when the utility of wages is greater than utility derived from welfare.
Families with exactly the same characteristics may make different choices and these
differences are accounted for by the error term e. The decision to receive welfare is a
binary variable; an individual will either choose to receive welfare or not to receive it.
In the model, annual earnings are a proxy for the market value o f labor; it
represents actual as-well-as potential earnings of an individual. The average state welfare
benefit is a proxy for actual welfare cash payments, which are difficult to estimate.
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Welfare benefits vary by state and almost always include Medicaid and a combination of
food, housing and energy subsidies. State benefit levels have proven to be an important
factor in individual choice of labor supply, migration, and kin support.^ In this study,
benefit levels are included in order to estimate their impact on the probability o f staying
on welfare.
Marriage and education have far reaching economic consequences. Marriage
provides for a greater division o f labor between market and non-market activity, while
education is an investment in human capital. Race, age, and gender are also included
because they are strongly associated with poverty and the receipt of welfare.
The model examines characteristics in year one to determine their effect on the
probability that a household will receive welfare in year two . More specifically,
characteristics firom 1992 are examined to determine the conditional probability that a
household will stop receiving welfare in 1993. The dependent variable (whether or not a
household receives welfare in 1993) is a dummy variable which takes the value o f 0 or 1.
Households that did not receive welfare in the second year have a value of 0 while
families that did receive welfare have a value o f 1. To represent such behavior we us the
logit model as follows:
Log (P\ / l-P\) = a +5iX i + et

Pi / 1 -Pi = the odds that a household will receive welfare

^ See Moffitt, incentive Effects o f the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A R eview , 24-32, 54-58; Lingxin
Hao, “ How Does a Single M other Choose Kin and Welfare Support?” Social Science Research 24 (March
1995): 1-27.
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Pi is a vector of the parameters to be estimated, the coefficients are interpreted as
the log o f the odds that the individual will receive welfare; X is a vector of explanatory
variables and e is the random error term. The explanatory variables included in the model
are earnings, employment, average monthly state benefit, gender, age, age squared,
marital status, children, children squared, high school diploma, some college, college
diploma. Black and Hispanic. A description of the independent variables and their
expected relationship with the dependent variables are summarized in Table 1.
The independent variable EARNINGS is wages obtained firom employment; it is
distinct fi-om income which may come from other sources. A priori, the coefficients on
earnings are expected to be negative because families with higher wages in year one are
more likely to leave welfare roles in year two. Earnings is also a proxy for the labor
market value o f an individual. Family-heads with higher labor market value are expected
to be more likely to leave welfare. Increased earnings will ultimately cause families to
lose their eligibility for welfare assistance altogether as income rises above state
established levels.
Most welfare recipients are not employed,'* however, welfare recipients that do
work are more likely to leave welfare for several reasons. This group may demonstrate a
stronger work attachment, greater work experience, and may have less o f a welfare
stigma because they are employed. Consequently, welfare recipients that are employed

* From 1960s to the late 1980s the employment rates o f welfare recipients has been less than 20
percent. See M o ffit Incentive Effects o f the U.S. Welfare Svstem: A R eview . 22.
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have a higher labor market value which equates to greater levels o f human capital. In the
model, employment is a dummy variable that is assigned a value o f 0 if the recipient is
not working or, 1 if working.
The average benefit by state is a proxy for the benefit level o f the household.
While the Federal Government provides matching funds, states determine the actual
benefit levels.^ Households in high benefit states are more likely to remain on welfare
because greater benefits increase the break-even point between welfare and work.
Greater levels of welfare payments provide an incentive to stay out o f the work force.
Therefore, the variable STATE BENEFIT is expected to be positively correlated to the
receipt o f welfare. Findings on this characteristic may be inconclusive because welfare
payments tend to reflect the cost o f living in a particular state.
Welfare is a system primarily designed to help single mothers and their children;
children in families that receive welfare generally live with their mothers in single-parent
families, and women in general also tend to invest more human capital in home
production.^ Therefore, male GENDER and MARRIED status are expected to be
negatively correlated with the receipt o f welfare. Fifteen percent o f the sample is male
and 25 percent are married. Marital status and gender are dummy variables with a value
o f either 0 or 1 and are defined as follows in the model:

* In 1994, the average state AFDC benefit was $352 per month including the District o f Columbia,
and ranged from a low o f SI 23 per month in Mississippi to a high o f $740 in Alaska. Source: US
Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, 1996 Statistical Abstract o f the United Sates. Volume
116.
* For a detailed discussion o f division o f labor in the household see Gary Becker, A Treastie on
the Familv. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1981): 30-53.
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Gender:

0 = female
1 = male

Married:

0 = not married
1 = married

AGE is in the model to determine how it effects the probability of receiving
welfare. It is hypothesized that the age o f the family head receiving welfare follows a
quadratic function, and it includes the variable AGE SQUARED. Specifically, the
probability o f being on welfare rises with age to a point and then begins to decline. This
specification o f the model allows one to calculate the age at which the likelihood o f
receiving welfare is the greatest. Family heads in the child bearing years may be more
likely to receive welfare.
Children in the household increase the cost o f labor force participation and the
presence and.number o f cliildren in the home are directly related to the receipt o f welfare.
One o f the major costs of children is the cost o f child care which is a deduction from
wages. Consequently, the variable CHILDREN is anticipated to be positively correlated
with the receipt of welfare.
The independent variable CHILDREN SQUARED is included in the model to
determine the effect of additional children on the probability o f receiving welfare. It is
popularly hypothesized that women on welfare have more children to increase their
welfare benefit; however, studies do not support this assertion.’ An alternative hypothesis
is that children are resource intensive, and they increase both the monetary and
^Gregory Acs, “The Impact o f Welfare on Young M others’ Subsequent Childbearing Decisions,”
Journal o f Human Resources 3 1, (September 1996): 899-941.
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Table 1.—Summary o f Explanatory Variables
Mean
(Standard
Deviation)

Variable

Definition

Expected
Sign

EARNINGS

Wages o f the sample in 1992

Negative

1,780
(3,936)

EMPLOYMENT

All civilians in the sample who were
employed at least one week during the 1992
survey period

Negative

.23
(.42)

STATE BENEFIT

Average 1990 monthly state welfare benefit
per households receiving AFDC

Positive

410
(148)

GENDER

Male = 1 and female = 0

Negative

.15
(.35)

AGE

Age o f the individual

Positive

34.9
(12.2)

AG E SQUARED

Age o f the individual squared

Negative

1,365
(1,054)

MARRIED

Marital status 1 = married and 0 = not
married

N egative

.25
(.43)

CHILDREN

Number o f children in the household

Positive

1.79
(1.46)

CHILDREN SQUARED

The number o f children squared

Negative

5.35
(7.94)

HIGH SCHOOL

1 = high school diploma and 0 = less than
high school diploma

Negative

.62
(.49)

SOME COLLEGE

1 = some college and 0 = no college

Negative

.21
(-41)

COLLEGE DEGREE

1 = college degree and 0 = no college degree

Negative

.03
(.17)

BLACK

1 = Black and 0 = otherwise

Positive

.29
(-45)

HISPANIC

1 = Hispanic and 0 = otherwise

Positive

.23
(-42)
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opportunity costs o f labor force participation. Single mothers on welfare have more
children than single mothers not on welfare; 2.6 children versus 2.1 respectively. In the
sample, the average number of children per household is 1.8. However, the sample is not
limited to single mothers. A negative sign on the coefficient would show that the
probability of receiving welfare increases with additional children up to a m a x im u m , then
decreases. The equation would fit a parabola with a maximum value. A positive sign
would suggest the opposite, and this equation would fit a parabola with a m in im u m value.
The expected sign of the variable CHILDREN SQUARED is negative, and we anticipate
that children increase the log odds probability o f receiving welfare at a decreasing rate.
Because education is an investment in human capital, the coefficients on HIGH
SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and COLLEGE DIPLOMA are expected to be negative.
Families receiving welfare generally have lower levels of educational attainment. The
US Census Bureau reported that 48 percent o f welfare mothers did not have a high school
diploma in 1990 compared with 25 percent o f the general population. Even fewer welfare
recipients have some college or a college degree. In the sample, findings show that 62
percent have a high school diploma, 23 percent have some college and 3 percent have a
college diploma.
Race is also a significant factor in earnings and employment. According to the
1990 census results. Black and Hispanic families had higher poverty rates than whites.
Therefore, it is likely that the independent variables BLACK and HISPANIC will be
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directly related to the receipt of welfare. O f the sample, 29 percent are Black and 23
percent are Hispanic.
The model includes observations o f 926 households, all o f which received AFDC
at least one month in 1992. In 1993, 417 o f these households stopped receiving AFDC
benefits and the remainder continued on welfare. All data for the model come from the
1993-94 Current Population Survey compiled by the Bureau of Census o f the US
Department of Commerce.* Average benefit levels are taken from the Bureau o f Census
1990 Statistical Abstract and correspond to each observation by state code. While it is
shown in the literature that the explanatory variables such as teen-pregnancy and
education are inter-related, a correlation matrix o f the independent variables shows that
multicollinearity is not a problem in the model. A correlation matrix and other
descriptive statistics are shown in the Appendix.

*Information from the Current Population Survey is lagged one-year. For example, the 1993
Survey com piles findings from 1992.
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CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The estimated coefficients for the variables EARNS, EMPLOYMENT, STATE
BENEFIT, GENDER, AGE, MARRIED, CHILDREN, CHILDREN- SQUARED, HIGH
SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and BLACK are consistent with a priori expectations, while
those for COLLEGE DIPLOMA and HISPANIC are not. All coefficients are significant
except for the variables HIGH SCHOOL, SOME COLLEGE and HISPANIC. The only
variable that is both significant and not consistent with a priori expectation is COLLEGE
GRADUATE. O f the variables that are significant, all are significant at the 5 percent
level except for COLLEGE GRADUATE and BLACK which are significant at the 10
percent level. Table 2 summarizes the model results and shows whether the variable is
consistent with a prior expectation.
The model results indicate that an annual income o f only $1,000 would leave only
11 percent o f the sample on welfare. This is an unexpectedly low amount that may not be
meaningful. Further examination o f the data reveals that over 50 percent o f the sample
reported zero or less earnings in 1993. This finding shows the complexity o f factors that

15
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Table 2—Estimated Coefficients of Earnings Potential and Family Structure
Coefficient
Consistent
a priori?

Variable
Constant

Coefficient
-2.024 **

Standard Error
0.6198

EARNINGS

-6.92E-05 **

2.36E-05

yes

EMPLOYED

-0.995 **

0.1980

yes

STATE BENEFIT

0.002 **

0.0005

yes

GENDER

-0.541 **

0.2200

yes

AGE

0.092 **

0.0312

yes

AGESQ.

-0.012 **

0.0003

yes

MARRIED

-1.084**

0.1916

yes

CHILDREN

0.552 **

0.1384

yes

CHILDREN SQ.

-0.044 *

0.0251

yes

HIGH SCHOOL

-0.080

0.1758

yes

SOME COLLEGE

-0.211

0.2097

yes

COLLEGE GRAD.

0.849 *

0.4856

no

BLACK

0.333 *

0.1865

yes

HISPANIC

-0.146

0.2009

no

n = 926 observations
log likelihood = -537.83
p=0.55
**
♦

significant at the 5 percent level
significant at the 10 percent level
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may influence the decision to receive welfare, and it may largely be attributed to
unreported income.’
The variable STATE BENEFIT is significant and negatively correlated with the
receipt o f welfare, suggesting that higher benefits decrease the log odds that a household
will stop receiving welfare. Lower state benefit levels decrease the break-even point
between work and welfare making lower paying jobs more attractive to welfare
recipients. Regional economies and poverty levels are also important determinants o f
welfare receipt. Washington DC had the highest rates of welfare recipients as a
percentage o f population at roughly 10 percent; South Dakota had the lowest at about
one-half of one percent. The average was 4.8 percent.”
The signs on the coefficients for the variables GENDER and MARRIED are
negative, consistent with the model expectations, and significant. Males are less likely to
continue receiving welfare. Males can expect to earn more than women with the current
wage gap between men and women around 71 percent.” Marriage is conducive to
division of labor and it provides two potential wage-eamers in the family. It also
provides two people to care for children and the household. Additionally, it is more

’ This finding is consistent with Blank and Ruggles (1996). The authors find that 50 percent o f
families leaving welfare rolls continued to be eligible for benefits at the time o f exit and, 30 percent
remained eligible a year later. See “When Do W omen Use AFDC and Food Stamps? The Dynamics o f
Eligibility versus Participation” The Journal o f Human Resources 31. 57-89.
Source: US Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, 1996 Statistical A bstract o f the
United Sates. Volum e 116.
" Lois Shaw et al. The Wage Gap: W om en‘s a n d M en's Earnings (Washington DC: W om en’s
Policy Institute, 1997, accessed November 21, 1997); htp://www.iwpr.org/WAGEGAP.htm; Internet.
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difficult for married households to qualify for welfare because state requirements for twoparent families tend to be more restrictive.
The coefficients for the variables AGE and AGE SQUARED are significant and
show that the likelihood o f being on welfare increases up to age 38, then decreases
thereafter. This result is consistent with a prior expectations and appears to correspond
with the period of young child rearing from roughly 18 to 39 years o f age. As women
leave their child bearing years, they may face lower living expenses because they may no
longer require child care. Older women may also become eligible for Social Security
which does not carry the welfare stigma. This variable seems to fit well in the quadratic
form and an omitted variable test on AG E SQUARED shows that it adds significant
explanatory value to the model.”

Figure 1 shows a plot of the probability o f receiving

welfare by age for the average recipient in the sample. The average values of the
independent variables are used to plot the graph when the variables are numeric. For
independent variables that are not numeric, the modes are used to calculate the graph. The
probability o f receiving welfare increases up to age 38 then drops sharply by age 55.
The number of children in the home is significant and positively correlated with
receiving welfare. Mothers that do not participate in the labor force in order to care for
children forego potential wages. Mothers that do participate in the labor force incur the
cost o f child care. The choice of at-home child care versus labor force participation is
common for the general population as well as women receiving welfare. Figure 2 shows
The test is based on the ratio o f the restricted maximized likelihood to the unrestricted
m aximized likelihood.
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how the number o f children effects the probability of staying on welfare for the average
welfare participant in the sample who is White. This is compared with individuals that
Age and the Probability of Welfare

35.0 m

m

20.0 Ï

15.0

Figure 1 Probability Table; Age and the Likelihood of Staying on Welfare

have the same characteristics but are Black. The model results indicate that a White
single woman with two children has a 36 percent probability of staying on welfare in the
following year. A woman with the same characteristics who is Black has a 56 percent
probability o f staying on welfare.
The independent variable CHILDREN SQUARED is significant and shows that
the probability of being on welfare increases with the number of children in the
household up to 6 children. However, only 12 percent o f the sample had four or more
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children, and just over one percent had six or more children. Consequently, this finding
is inconclusive, and it appears that a quadratic fimction on children may not fit the model.
An omitted variable test shows that this variable does not add significant explanatory
power to the model. 13

Children and the Probability of Welfare

114

j n W hite!
; ■ Black !

C h ild ren

Figure 2: Probability o f Staying on Welfare for the Average Recipient Based on
the Number of Children for Whites and Blacks

Having a high school diploma and some college is negatively correlated with the
receipt of welfare. However, the findings on these terms are not statistically significant.
According to the US Census Bureau, people with a high school diploma earn more on

’^The omitted variable test shows that the likelihood ratio statistic is significant at approximately
the 10 percent level. See footnote 9 for a description o f the omitted variable test.
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average than those without such a degree and also have higher employment levels. The
most surprising finding o f the model is the variable COLLEGE GRADUATE. A college
degree increases the likelihood of staying on welfare. This variable is significant at the
10 percent level and the coefficient is positive. It is unclear why this occurs, and this is a
topic for future study. Individuals with a college degree may have a better understanding
of the bureaucratic welfare system or they may have higher rates o f disabilities that afflict
the chronically poor.
The variable BLACK is significant at roughly the 10 percent level and is directly
related to welfare, while the variable HISPANIC is insignificant and negatively correlated
to welfare. Many economists and sociologists maintain that structural differences and
discrimination account for the difference in employment between racial groups. Blacks
are more likely to live below the poverty level and are less likely to receive a high school
diploma.’** Additionally, more Black children are bom into single parent families.’^

"Source: US Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f the Census, 1996 Statistical Abstract o f the
United Sates. Volume 116.
'^Douglas J. Besharov and Timothy S. Sullivan, “Welfare Reform and Marriage,” Public Interest
125, (Fall 1996): 81-94.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose o f this study is to determine which demographic groups are most
likely to stay on welfare and which groups are more likely to leave welfare. Findings
show that single female heads in high benefit states, with minor children, and with low
earnings and employment are the least likely group to leave the welfare roles. The most
surprising finding relates to education, and a college diploma increases the likelihood o f
receiving welfare. It is important to distinguish this finding from other studies that
examine participation rates among eligible welfare recipients. Family heads with a
college degree are less likely to receive welfare in the first place. However, family-heads
with a college degree that do go on welfare are more likely to remain on welfare.
Race is also a factor, and the coefficient on the variable Black is significant and
positively correlated to the receipt of welfare. Blacks are more likely to remain on
welfare. This racial group experiences higher rates o f poverty and has a higher incidence
o f single-parent families.

22
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The policy implications are that single mothers with children should be heavily
targeted for work programs and other benefits such as subsidized child care. Additionally,
the reasons why Black women and college educated welfare recipients are more likely to
remain on welfare should be explored so that programs may be developed to respond to
these groups. More generally, the model shows that as earnings and employment
increase, the likelihood o f remaining on welfare decreases. Lower State AFDC benefit
levels are significant in this study and, they may encourage families to rely more heavily
on private resources such as extended family. Other general conclusions from the model
are that marriage and fewer children are beneficial in ending the receipt of welfare. These
results suggest the need for family plamiing, birth control, and education.
The number o f households on welfare has declined since the welfare reform act o f
1996, and long-term trends in welfare participation have also declined. Long-term
reduction’s in welfare are due primarily to changing demographics, reduced real welfare
payments, and a strong economy.

Future studies, perhaps incorporating post-welfare

reform data, may be useful to test whether the predictions o f this study hold true.
Additionally, further studies may investigate findings on the impact of a college degree
on staying on welfare.

Philip K. Robins, “ Explaining Recent Declines in AFDC Participation” Public Finance
Quarterly. 18, April 1990): 236-237.
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APPENDIX

CORRELATION MATRIX AND
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

EARNS1
EARNS1
EMPLOYED 1
AVEGENEF1T1
GENDER1
AGE1
AGE1SQ
MARRIED1
CHILDRN1
CHILDRN1SQ
HIGHSCHOOL1
S0MEC0L1
C0LGRAD1
BLACK1
HISPANIC1

0.4506
-0.0698
0.077
0.0160
-0.0119
0.1255
-0.046
-0.0497
0.1669
0.1239
0.0211
0.0432
-0.1376
AGE1

EARNS1
EMPLOYED1
AVEGENEFIT1
GENDER1
AGE1
AGE1SQ
MARRIED1
CHILDRN1
CHILDRN1SQ
HIGHSCHOOL1
S0MEC0L1
C0LGRAD1
BLACK1
HISPANIC1

0.0160
-0.0347
0.0791
0.1888
0.9762
0.1230
-0.2781
-0.1490
-0.0908
-0.0174
0.1134
-0.0797
0.036

EMPLOYED1 AVGBENEFIT1 GENDER1
-0.0698
0.4506
0.0774
-0.0462
-0.02277
-0.0462
0.043
-0.0227
0.04
1
-0.0347
0.0791
0.18883
-0.063
0.0640
0.01902
0.06
0.22317
0.0883
-0.0484
-0.0443
-0.1465
-0.0665
-0.038
-0.08374
0.1736
0.0713
-0.05751
0.056
0.1186
-0.06659
0.0743
0.0430
0.09129
0.0206
-0.2958
-0.11007
0.2962
-0.14863
-0.01965
AGE1SQ
MARRIED1
CHILDRN1 CHILDRN1SQ
-0.0467
-0.0119
0.1225
-0.04972
-0.063
0.0883
-0.4843
-0.0665
0.0640
0.06
-0.04439
-0.038
0.1902
0.2231
-0.1465
-0.0837
0.1230
-0.27815
0.9760
-0.1490
0.0930
-0.31943
-0.1782
0.11468
0.0930
0.1022
0.1146
1
-0.3194
0.9045
0.1022
0.90458
-0.1782
-0.1304
-0.031
-0.10576
-0.1141
-0.052
-0.1059
-0.0338
-0.1241
0.1244
0.12075
0.1111
-0.0901
0.0617
0.10302
-0.0786
0.123
0.06179
-0.0010
0.0170
0.0366
24
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EARNS1
EMPL0YED1
AVEGENEFIT1
GENDER1
AGE1
AGE1SQ
MARRIED 1
CHILDRN1
CHILDRN1SQ
HIGHSCHOOL1
SOMECOL1
C0LGRAD1
BLACK1
HISPANIC1

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability

HIGHSCHOOL1 SOMECOL1
C0LGRAD1
BLACK1
1H1SPANIC1
0.1669
0.1239
0.0211
0.04326
-0.1376
0.1736
0.1186
0.0430
0.02065
-0.1486
0.0713
0.056
0.0743
-0.29583
0.2962
-0.0575
-0.0665
0.0912
-0.11007
-0.0196
-0.0908
-0.0174
0.1134
-0.07976
0.036
-0.1141
-0.0338
0.1111
-0.07865
0.0366
-0.031
-0.052
0.1244
-0.2155
-0.0010
-0.1057
-0.105
-0.1207
0.10602
0.0617
-0.1304
-0.1241
-0.0901
0.1235
0.0170
0.4080
0.1360
0.04493
-0.234
0.4080
0.3333
-0.04664
0.124
0.1360
0.3333
-0.03983
-0.0955
0.0449
-0.0466
-0.0398
1
-0.3520
-0.234
-0.124
-0.0955
-0.35201

H1GHSCHOOL1 SOMECOL1
COLGRAD1
BLACK1
H1SPANIC1
0.62
0.21
0.03
0.29
0.23
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.486
0.409
0.168
0.454
0.423
-0.489
1.403
5.594
0.928
1.261
1.238
2.968
32.291
1.861
2.588
156.685
9.47E-35

303.863
1.04E-66

37933.485
O.OOE+00

183.070
1.77E-40

251.854
2.04E-55

926

926

926

926

926

Observations
EARNS1

EMPLOYED1 ,AVGBENEFIT1 GENDER1
410.3
0.23
0.15
0
380
0
1
750
1
0
122
0
0.420
148.333
0.354
0.018
1.994
1.290
2.662
2.019
4.976

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis

1780.3
0
28000
0
3935.491
3.116
14.286

Jarque-Bera
Probability

6412.831
O.OOE+00

261.072
2.04E-57

37.192
8.39E-09

764.324
1.07E-166

926

926

926

926

Observations
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AGE1
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Observations

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev
Skewness
Kurtosis
Jarque-Bera
Probability
Observations

34.9
33
84
15
12.172
1.213
4.849

AGE1SQ
MARRIED1
CHILDRN1 CHILDRN1SQ
1365.3
0.25
1.79
5.35
1089
0
2
4
7056
1
9
81
225
0
0
0
1054.116
0.431
1.460
7.942
2.301
1.178
0.910
3.745
9.722
2.385
4.347
25.680

358.917
1.15E-78

2560.772
O.OOE+00

228.562
2.34E-50

197.796
1.12E-43

22012.24
O.OOE+00

926

926

926

926

926

HIGHSCH00L1 :SOMECOL1
1COLGRAD1
BLACK1
1
HISPANIC1
0.62
0.21
0.03
0.29
0.23
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0.486
0.409
0.168
0.454
0.423
-0.489
5.594
1.403
0.928
1.261
1.238
2.968
32.291
1.861
2.588
156.685
9.47E-35

303.863
1.04E-66

37933.485
O.OOE+00

183.070
1.77E-40

251.854
2.04E-55

926

926

926

926

926
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